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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
0\VEN rvr. COLLETI, CANTLA '{ 
0 TANZOLA, INC., and CI_JARK 
TANKLINES COMPANY, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
PUBLIC SERVICE C.OMMISSION 
OF UTAH, R. A. GOULD~ and 
LANG TRANSPORATION COR-
PORATION, 
Defendants. 
Case No. 
7279 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case is before the Supreme Court on writ of certiorari 
issued January 7, 1949, .(R. 64) directing the Public Service 
Commission of Utah to certify for review the record of its 
proceedings in an application for transfer from one carrier 
to another of a certificate of convenience and necessity for 
the hauling of petroleum and petroleum products as a 
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common motor carrier, or, alternatively, for cancellation 
of one certificate and issuance of a new one vvithout a 
showing of public convenience and necessity. 
The applicants before the Commission were R. A. 
Gould, a certificated carrier, and Lang Transportation C~rpora­
tion, a corporation with common carrier rights in other states 
and in interstate commerce. These two had entered into 
a contract ( R. 8) for the sale by Gould and purchase 
by Lang of Gould's equipment, rights, and going business. 
At the hearing plaintiffs and others protested the requested 
relief but the Commission granted the application sub-
stantially as prayed for. Application for stay and petition 
for rehearing were filed with and denied by the Commission. 
Plaintiffs sought and were denied a stay order from this 
Honorable Court. 
The parties will be referred to in the follovving manner: 
R. A. Gould as Gould; Lang Transportation Corporation as 
Lang; Cantlay & Tanzola, Inc., as Cantlay & Tanzola; 
Collett Tank Lines or 0\\ren M. Collett as Collett: Clark 
T anklines Company as Clark; The Public Service Com-
mission of Utah as The Commission. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The application of Gould and Lang (R. 1-21) alleged 
that Gould was a common motor carrier of petroleum and 
petroleum products intrastate in -Utah under Certificate of 
Public Convenience and Necessity No. 784 issued by The 
Commission August 27, 194 7; that Lang was a common 
motor carrier of such products under Inter-State Commerce 
Commission authority; that the two had entered into an agree-
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ment ''to sell and transfer·· the operating authority of Gould: 
that Lang is fit. willing. and able to perform the service; that 
no hazard or burden on the highways will result from the 
requested change of authority and that the transfer will be 
in the public interest. The applicants prayed that the 
transfer be approved. or, alternatively, that the Gould 
certificate be cancelled and a like certificate issued to Lang. 
The attached agreement ( R. 8-10) provided in paragraph 
I for sale of ''The certificate of public convenience and 
necessity \vhich Seller ovvns and holds" for a price of 
$20,000.00. 
The hearing vvas protracted. Applicants indicated 
the opinion that they need show only that Lang was ''fit. 
\vii ling and able'' to render the service to obtain the desired 
result ( R. 152, 172-173, 176). Protestants contended 
that public convenience and necessity must be shown before 
Lang could obtain the desired certificate ( R. 183, 18~). 
The Commissioners . were concerned about ''Public interest'' 
(R. 274, 336-337, 347) and one of them talked also of 
"convenience and necessity" ( R. 170, 173,347, 348, 439). 
Applicants contended ''convenience and necessity was not 
involved" (R. 168, 171-176, 181). The record contains 
much argument incidental to the testimony ( R. 164-186, 
303-314, 324-330, 334-339, 346-357, 447-474). 
Plaintiffs concede that Lang showed that it was and 
is "fit, willing and able" to operate as a common 1notor 
carrier. Testimony of adver,se effect on the public was 
offered by protestants to show prospective loss of business 
which, if realized, would impair services offered to the public. 
No shipper witness was offered to show public convenience 
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and necessity, although the witness Hurley, representing 
Tidewater Associated Oil Company, testified ( R. 290-321. 
392-4 17) that Lang had in other operations and could be 
expected in this one to give excellent service ( R. 317). 
Plaintiffs believe no worthwhile objective wouJd or 
could be realized in abstracting the testimony in full and 
therefore suggest hereinafter the salient features of the 
testimony of each witness relating to the questions of 
probable interest to this Court. 
R. A. GOULD testified that he held Certificate of 
Conv~nience and Necessity No. 784 (R. 153, Ex. 1, R. 66) 
which he had agreed to sell or transfer to Lang (R. 156) in 
the agreement, Exhibit A ( R. 68) . He wanted the Con1-
mission to approve the agreement and· issue like authority to 
I_Jang ( R. 161 ) . His operating authority and good will 
vvere fairly priced at $20,000 (R. 163, 186-187 ) . If the 
agreement was not approved by the Commission his down 
payment of $5,000 would be returned to him (R. 190). 
and he vvould continue to operate the business without any 
plans for expansion ( R. 199) . 
If the application is denied Gould will keep his certi-
ficate and continue to work it ( R.266). He is at a dis-
advantage with the larger operators who pull in a piece of 
equipment when needed and do not have to sit around and 
wait for something to happen ( R. 266) . Gould has been 
serving the public in practically every Utah county ( R. 286). 
HOWARD M. LANG is Vice-President and General 
Manager of Lang (R. 202), the largest petroleum carrier 
west of the Mississippi and 4th or 5th in the nation ( R. 233) . 
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L.ang has assets and liabilities of $2.466.501.56 ( R. 71-72). 
owns and operates 289 pieces of equipment (R. 73.205). 
\\ith 9 more on order ( R. 7 l, 204-205). Lang has a 
C'ertificate from the Interstate Commerce Commission to 
operate heh\'een points in Southern California and 
Sou them Utah and other points ( R. 7 4.206) . Some 
equipment is registered in Utah and the Utah business 
revenue has been steadily increasing over several years 
(R. 207). This revenue "vas $87,922.50 in 1943. 
$127,738.48 in 1946. $146,272.59 in 1947, and 
S 126,068. 10 for the first 8 months of 1948 (Ex. 8, R. 78). 
Total carrier operating income for the first 8 months of 
1948 \vas $2.374.727.27 (Ex. 7. R. 79-A). If the 
application. is granted Lang will lease Gould's terminal 
property in Salt Lake City, employ Gould to manage its 
''spread'' here, and will operate part of Gould's equipment 
( R. 208). replacing the others with larger units to serve 
all who call upon Lang ( R. 209) . 
"Q. Now, Mr. Lang, will you explain to the 
Commission, please, why it is that you undertook to 
acquire the business of Gould? 
''A. Well by this last exhibit you can see 
the volumn of petroleum products that are moving 
from the Southern California area into Southern 
Utah. and I am sort of alarmed at our production 
situation on the Coast. and I can see gasoline 
probably produced here out of this new Standard Oil 
refinery pushing west, and I might wind up some day 
with this traffic dried up on me. That was really 
the main reason I was interested in acquiring Gould's 
operation." ( R. 210-211 ) 
Long has an application for a Certificate of Public Con-
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enience and Necessity pending before the Commission 
from a time prior to its agreement to buy Gould's business. 
t"fhis will be withdrawn or dismissed if this application 
is successful (R. 211.). 
Gould ts now trucking for Tidewater Associated and 
Standard Oil Company of California ( R. 212) . Lang 
hauls from California into Southern Utah for Standard 
Oil of California, Shell Company, Texas Company, 
Tidewater Associated, he thinks some for Union 
Oil Company ( R. 214-215). If the certificate is obtained 
Lang. \Vould seek to serve the companies for which it now 
hauls in California and from California into Southern 
Utah ( R. 216) ; is unwilling that the certificate, if granted, 
be restricted to hauling into Southern Utah. $20,000 is a 
fair value for G~uld' s franchise ( R. 226); Lang will 
compete \Vith other carriers and take such business as it 
can (R. 235). 
EDWARD D. HURLEY of San Francisco is Chief 
Rate Clerk for Tidewater Associated Oil Company ( R. 291 ) . 
His company purchases products from Utq.h Oil Refinery and 
distributes them through Associated Oil and Gas Company 
and Mountain Oil Company ( R. 293) vis the Gould Trucking 
Company ( R. 294). Gould has rendered this service for 
14 years ( R. 294). Tidewater Associated pays the freight 
for this transportation and controls the routing ( R. 298) . 
His company has used Lang for transportation of petroleum 
products for 25 years and has received ''very excellent 
service'' ( R 316) . If the application is granted Tidewater 
Associated will continue to use Lang for intrastate 
transportation in Utah ( R. 393, 406). After delivery 
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of petroleum products to Associated Oil and Gas Company 
in bulk, Tidewater has nothing to do \:vith further trans-
portation or delivery (R. 403). Tidewater has also used 
the services of Cantlay & T anzola in California and Arizona 
and occasionally in Utah and their services have been 
satisfactory (R. 406,407). They have utilized the services 
of Collett into Idaho and that service has been satisfactory 
( R. 407). Witness is not familiar vvith the services of 
Clark ( R. 406). The reason for preferring to use Lang 
"is because of a personal relationship * * * with them 
on the coast·' and not because they are more efficient 
(R. 407). 
OWEN M. COLLETT, one of the owners of Collett 
Tank Lines, is operating under Utah Public Service Com-
mission certificate of convenience and necessity No. 783 
(R. 320-321, Ex. 8, R. 80). As of June 1, 1948, Collett 
operated 70 pieces of equipment (Ex. 9, R. 82) and has 
discontinued 10 of those since that date because of loss of 
traffic due to Cantlay & T anzola' s obtaining interstate 
authority into Idaho ( R. 323). (This loss of traffic 
appears on Ex. 10, R. 84.) Collett's total assets and 
liabilities are $334,993.48 (Ex·. 11, R. 85). Loss of 
a substantial amount of business would materially affect 
his business and granting of the application would probably 
result in substantial loss of intrastate business ( R. 332,333, 
341. 342, 358). During 1948 Collett has had idle equip-
ment. averaging about 10 units, in addition to the 10 that 
were cut off ( R. 358) . Loss of traffic and revenue 
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cause curtailment of services, reduction of personnel, and 
delays in serving the public who are the shippers and 
eventual diminution of equipment and of ability to render 
service. T errninal expense is made excessive and pressure 
for increased rates gets stronger ( R. 359-362) . Truck 
rates in Utah are 20% under rail, while in states to the 
east and north they are the same as or 20% more than rail 
( R. 362-363). At the time of Ex Parte 166, states to 
the east and north of Utah took increases in motor carrier 
rates and Utah took none (R. 363,365). Collett ~as 
giving shippers one and two hour service for shipments 
moving up to 1 00 miles during 1948 up to June, with 24 
hours per day dispatching service. Since June personnel 
has been cut and service has been cut to about six hours. 
This is better service than is given in any of the surrounding 
states where most carriers give service of from 24 and 36 
hours to as high as 3 or 4 days. The keen competition in 
Utah is the reason for the service given (R. 365-366). 
Collett is seeking new business and expanded territory to 
keep present equipment busy ( R. 367). There is a place 
and a need for small equipment in serving Utah intrastate 
business ( R. 368) . If additional business, such as 
Associated Oil, or Shell Petroleum, were tendered, Collett 
could handle it ( R. 369) . Documents marked Exhibit 12 
are reports of the State Tax Commission ( R. 86-125) 
showing gasoline refined in, imported to, exported from, 
and consumed in Utah by months from June, 1946, to 
May, 1948, with some months missing as follows: 
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Refined Consumed 
Month In Utah Imports Exports In Utah 
June 1946 14,476.733 3,610,430 4.068,774 13,642.141 
September 1946 16.019.949 3,392,646 4,115.192 13,980,591 
October 15,409,750 3,352,567 4,275,269 13,401,097 
November 14.398.169 3,071,468 3,116,771 11,750,415 
December 14,532.783 3,077,418 3,345,639 11,617,556 
January 1947 14,452,111 2,997,625 3,078,728 11,099,977 
February 13,810,513 2.669,318 3,126,097 10,363,305 
rvtarch 14,007,955 2,446,941 4,039,798 12,123,267 
April 13,779,519 2.671,483 4,681,967 13,064,868 
May 17,523,031 2,784;901 4,853,681 13,925,940 
July 17,021,861 3,110,019 6,446,528 17,233,922 
August 17,918,774 3,115,255 6,580,704 16,893,193 
September 15,897,642 2,939,365 5,980,956 16,261,613 
November 18.925,279 1,990,412 3,578,845 12,477,233 
December 14,858,737 1,899,874 4,066,294 13,041,776 
January 1948 16,564,828 2,116,682 3,662,680 12,225,217 
February 15,827,252 2.014,209 3,028,254 10,855,306 
March 12,775,668 1,894,763 4,132,271 12,966,404 
April 17,001,576 2,356,824 4,885,143 14.675,523 
May 19,257,105 2,810,957 5,704,448 15.142,606 
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Imports into·· Utah by the companies ~erved by Lang 
into Southern Utah.· (R. 214-215) taken from Exhibit 12 
are as follows: 
Standard Oil Union 
Month Oalifomia Shell Texas Oil 
June 1946 621.145 328,238 165,611 21,130 
September 612,402 285,183 165,856 27,7'14 
October 455,235 275,066 149,358 7,094 
November 402,522 186,731 99,035 oo.oop 
December 367,870 209,305 80,932 00.000 
January 1947 261,315 154,284 69,032 00,000 
February 327,019 182,022 60,780 6,938 
March 242,310 180,457 70,801 00,000 
Ap~il 385,501 277,125 98,168 00,000 
May 204,317 355,461 56,360 20,900 
July 780,067 372,867 18,666 48,395 
. 
August 546,937 363,416 19,915 50,702 
September 303,338 924.760 20,965 27,531 
November 113,507 194,333 56,410 00,000 
December 88,109 198.278 8,145 00,000 
January 1948 99,576 150,969 8,849 7,029 
February 76,810 271,447 9,215 00,000 
March 95,350 153,146 12,616 00,000 
April '' 127,410 212,443 18,873 20. t 18 
May 108,1 10 376,793 15,916 30,361 
(These reports show no imports by Tidewater Associated 
or Associated Oil. ) 
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The equipment of Gould. Clark. Cantlay & T anzola. 
and Collett is more than adequate for the. transportation 
needs in this state ( R. 373-374). There is keen com-
petition between the petroleum carriers in Utah (R. 374). 
Collett's intrastate traffic for the first eight months 
of 1948 \VaS probably 1 Q% higher than for the corresponding 
period of 1947 ( R. 378). Gould has been operating longer 
than Collett and in 1947 had $89~000 gross revenue 
compared with Collett's $800.000 including interstate 
commerce. Collett's intrastate gross revenue was 
$9o.ooo (R. 381). 
Collett's ratio of earnings to gross revenue was 5% 
in 1947 compared to 11% in 1948. The increase was 
because the volume was up ( R. 386) . And when the 
volume dropped in 1948 the profit dropped better than 
half (R. 387). 
If this application should be ·granted it is Collett's 
opinion he would lose tO% of Texas Company and Stan-
dard Oil Company business, which together represent 85% 
of his intrastate business ( R. 527). Motor carriers ar~ 
presently benefiting from the railroad's inability to handle 
petroleum because of shortage of tank cars ( R. 528) . 
R. M. BRYAN is Utah and Idaho manager for 
Cantlay & T anzola which operates under Certificate of 
Convenience and Necessity No. 785 (R. 418-419, Ex. 
15, R. 126). The company has been in business since 
1929 and has interstate as well . as intrastate authority in 
California, Arizona, and Nevada ( R. 421 ) . They have 
a large. modern terminal in Salt Lake City where all 
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general maintenance work and complete repair work is done 
(R. 421-423, Ex. 16, R. 131). They maintain 15 
mechanics and 24-hour dispatch service. and have 26 power· 
units (of which 9 are used in the Idaho business ( R. 521 ) ) 
and 27 trailers stationed at Salt Lake City ( R. 423-424, Ex. 
17, R. 132) . The equipment has special features for use 
on Utah Highways (R. 427). They have idle equipment 
quite regularly and could handle additional traffic. They 
now serve all types of customers throughout the state ( R: 
428) . They hauled 35,705,231 gallons of petroleum 
products intrastate in Utah in 194 7 (Ex. 19, R. 134) , and 
in the first six months of 1948 hauled 18,255,825 with 
gross revenue of $ 198,985.98 ( R. 135, Ex. 20) . Total 
assets and liabilities are $1,365.274.35 (R. 433, Ex. 21. 
R. 136). Volume of traffic for July 1948 was approxi-
mately 125,000 gallons less than for July 1947. 
They serve from 75 to 85 points in Utah ( R. 435}. 
Should additional equipment be needed in Utah, the com-
pany can supply it. They are handling all business 
tendered and have never been compelled to refuse traffic 
(R. 437). · Cantlay & Tanzola serves the same companies 
in Utah that Lang serves into Southern Utah interstate 
(R. 441). 
The carriers in Utah are actively soliciting new business 
in Utah ( R. 453). Loss of business reduces the load factor 
on equipment, increases overhead in proportion to revenue 
and thus reduces the power to serve the public ( R. 440) . 
This increase of costs compels rate increases to give a stable 
operation in a satisfactory manner (R. 441). 
The increase in business the first six months of 1948 
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compared with the first six months of 194 7 "vas approxi-
mately four million gallons and V\'as due to increase in 
the fuel oil business ( R. 481-482). Increasing intrastate 
business in 1948 was due to shortage of railroad tank cars 
as compared with 1947 (R. 486-487). 
The equipment of Cantlay & T anzola, Collett, and 
Clark, could handle all the gallonage being hauled by 
them and by Gould and render good serVice to the public 
( R. 523). His con1pany and Collett could each carry 25 
to 30 per cent more gallonage than they are hauling and 
Clark could carry 50% more ( R. 524). 
BOYCE R. CLARK is manager of Clark T anklines 
Company, operating under Certificate of Convenience and 
Necessity No. 786, with 26 pieces of equipment (R. 488-
490, Ex. 22, 23, R. 138-140). Total assets and liabili-
ties are $136,892.39 (R. 141). Clark now has idle 
equipment and is soliciting new business amongst keen compe-
tition ( R. 492). Clark could haul 125,000 gallons a 
day if it were available ( R. 493) . 
If Clark loses business because of additional compe-
tition. it would put them in ''a very unsound financial 
position" after having bought some new equipment, because 
of increasing proportionate overhead costs ( R. 502,504). 
This would affect their ability to serve the public because 
of inability to keep crews and equipment busy ( R. 504). 
Truck rates have not increased lately in Utah and are 20% 
under rail ( R. 505) . 
Clark has purchased two neV\' trucks and trailers recent-
ly although they had idle equipment at the time ( R. 509-
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5 1 0) . If Lang were given a certificate it would take 
some of Clark's business, such as from the Utah Oil account 
(R. 511). 
The Report and Order of the Commission were issued 
December 16, 1948 (R. 40-50). 
The report consists largely of an argument and justifi-
cation for cancelling one certificate and issuing a like certificate 
to Lang in the absence of a showing of convenience and ne-
cessity. References to the general qualifications of the two 
applicants are included and it is found that Lang is financially 
responsible, fit, willing and able to operate as a common 
rnotor carrier ~nd that it will comply with the laws of the 
State of Utah and not burden the highways unduly (R. 
44). The report also discusses the public interest as it 
would be affected by the claim of protestants that the 
entry of Lang into Utah intrastate commerce would adverse-
ly affect them and impair the service which they <:auld 
render to the ·public. The Commission was not satisfied 
v.;ith this testimony and found that the public interest 
would not be adversely affected ( R. 45-46). 
On the question of public convenience and necessity 
the report of the Commission states: 
''In Case No. 2882 heretofore heard, being 
the application of R. A. Gould, this Commis-
sion found and determined that public conven-
ience and necessity required the rendering of 
service by Gould as in said application prayed, 
and pursuant to its report in said case made. 
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issued to Gould. on or about the 27th day of 
August. 1947, Certificate of Conveyance and Ne-
cessity No. 784, authorizing Gould to operate 
as a common motor carrier for the transportation 
of petroleum and petroleum products. except road 
oil and asphalt. in bulk. between Salt Lake 
Citv and \Voods Cross on one hand and all 
oth~r points and places in the State of Utah on 
the other ( R. 4 1 ) . 
"On or about said 27th day of August. 1947, 
in other cases then pending. this Commission 
issued further certificates of convenience and 
necessity as follo\\'S: (Refers to Certificates No. 
783. 785, 78b and 834.) (R. 41) 
* * * 
''This Commission in said cases found and 
determined that public convenience and neces-
sity required the services of each and all of said 
carriers as in said certificates authorized and 
prescribed. Such finding and determination is 
now final and absolute in each of said cases, 
and no contention by any party to this proceeding 
is no\v made that public convenience and necessity 
do not continue to require the rendering of the 
service as in said certificates ordered and author-
ized bv each of the holders thereof, and each of 
said ~ertificates, including the Applicant Gould, 
has since the issuance thereof continued and now 
continues to exercise the rights and perform the 
service in said respective certificates authorized 
and to discharge his or its duty to the public 
thereunder. ( R. 42) 
''The motor cnrrier rules and regulations of 
this Commission no"'' in force and effect preclude 
transfer from one carrier to another of operating 
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authority and require that the certificate of con-
venience and necessity of the retiring carrier be 
cancelled and annulled and that a new certificate 
of convenience and necessity with like auth~rity 
be issued to the carrier who undertakes the per-
formance of the service. If the transaction herein 
proposed be authorized by this Commission. it 
must be carried out pursuant to such procedure. 
(R. 43) 
''The contention was made at the hearing 
and in their briefs by certain parties protestant 
that i\pplicants were under the duty of showing 
in this case that public convenience and necessity 
now require the service sought in this case to be 
rendered by Lang. As hereinabove shovvn. this 
Commission has determined in a prior proceeding 
that public convenience and necessity require the 
services which Gould is authorized to perform 
under said Certificate No. 784. Lang proposes 
simply that he may be authorized to enjoy the 
rights and discharge the · obligations and duties 
of Gould. Lang seeks the right to perform 
those services which Gould is presently authoriz-
ed to perform, nothing more. It having been 
determined by this Commission that public cqn-
venience and necessity require such services. that 
question is not an issue in this case and need not 
again be determined. The motor carrier rules 
and regulations of this Commission now and 
since June 1. 1937. in force and effect so provide: 
and the procedure of this Commission in cases 
such as this has been consistently in accordance 
therewith." ( R. 44) 
The order of the Commission simply issues a certificate 
to Lang and cancels the certificate of Gould and fixes 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
19 
a time for the effectuation of' the order ( R. 48-49). 
Notice of consummation of the transaction was filed with 
the Commission December 23. 1948 ( R. 51 ) and appli-
cation for rehearing and for suspension of order was filed 
December 27. 1948 ( R. 52-56). The order denying 
application for rehearing and for suspension of order was 
dated December 30, 1948 ( R. 57). Petition for writ of 
certiorari and for supersedeas was filed in this court 
January 5, 1949, (R. 59-63) and writ of certiorari was 
issued J~nuary 7, 1949. The court subsequently denied 
the application for supersedeas and the record of the 
Commission \vas filed in this court March 22, 1949. 
STATEtviENT OF ERRORS RELIED ON 
Plaintiffs rely upon the follovving propositions as 
constituting error in the decision of the Commission. 
I. A Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity 
issued by the Public Service Commission of Utah is not 
a property right and cannot be transferred without the 
approval of The Commission. 
II. The Public Service Commission of Utah has no 
authority to transfer a Certificate of Public Convenience 
and Necessity in the · absence of a showing of public con-
venience and necessity. 
Ill. The Public Service Commission of Utah cannot 
take judicial notice of the existence of public convenience 
nnd necessity based upon evidence at a prior hearing in 
another case. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
A CERTIFICATE OF CONVENIENCE AND 
NECESSITY ISSUED BY THE PUBLIC SERVICE 
COMMISSION OF UTAH IS NOT A PROP-
ERTY RIGHT AND CANNOT BE TRANS-
FERRED ~THOUT THE APPROVAL OF 
THE COMMISSION. 
l t is doubtful that defendants Lang and Gould contend 
anything contrary to this statement. In answer to a 
question of Commissioner Carlson, Mr. Cornwall stated 
that he assumed the transfer could not be made: 
''We assume that under the regulations of 
this Commission, that the holder of that certifi-
cate enjoys sorne property right in that operating 
authority; that if the Commission is satisfied that 
the Lang Transportation Corporation vvill exercise 
those rights and render like service to the public. 
that the Commission will cancel the authority of 
Mr. Gould and issue like authority to the Lang 
Transportation Corporation.'' ( R. 158). 
The consideration of $20,000 for the operating 
authority suggests that both the applicants thought Gould 
had sornething to sell, and if this Court approves this 
transfer the certificate issued by the Commission in dis-
charge o·f a governmental function will be given real 
monetary value. 
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In Effenberger v. Marconnit. 135 Neb. 558, 283 N.W. 
223, 224. a case involving an attempted assignment through 
the power of the district court, the Supreme Court of 
Nebraska said: 
"In Pennsylvania Railroad Co. v. Public 
Utilities Commission. 155 N.E. 694, the court in 
discussing the nature of a certificate of con-
venience and necessity said (Page 696) : 
'· 'This court has repeatedly declared that 
a certificate of convenience and necessity, issued 
by the Public Utilities Commission to the motor 
transportation company is not a franchise, and 
that the holder of such certificate does not there-
by acquire a property right in the route covered 
by such certificate; that the issuing of said certi-
ficate is authorized only for the purpose of pro-
moting the public convenience and necessity and 
not for the purpose of conferring upon the holder 
of such certificate any proprietary interest or 
franchise in the public highways; that the pur-
pose in limiting the number of certificates that 
may be granted over the same route is to promote 
the public convenience and necessity by restricting 
the number of buses to the needs of the public, 
and thus occasion as little inconvenience as 
possible to the public using the highway in the 
usual and ordinary \vay, and to insure to the 
holder of the certificate such immunity from com-
petition as vvill enable him to serve the public 
convenience and necessity by regular, continuous 
public service; any certificate of convenience and 
necessity is in the nature of a revokable personal 
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permit and has not the attributes of a property 
right.' 
''The distinction between a franchise and · a 
certificate of convenience and necessity is aptly 
made in Re. St. Johns Riverline Company, 
7 P.U.R., N.S., 268, as follows: 
'' 'A certificate of public convenience and 
necessity, however, is distinctly different from the 
grant of a franchise to use and occupy streets. 
The franchise to use and occupy streets is a grant 
of a public right for the use of public streets 
while a certificate of public convenience and 
necessity is stricti y a regulatory measure, and the 
granting or witholding of a certificate is an exer-
cise of the power of the state to determine 
whether the rights and interests of the general 
public will be advanced by the prosecution of 
the enterprise which it is proposed to carry on for 
the service of the public.' * * * 
''We necessarily conclude that a certificate 
of convenience and necessity is in the nature of 
a pe~it or license and that it is not property in 
any legal or constitutional sense. It is a mere 
license that can be amended or revoked by the 
power authorized to issue it. Such being the 
case, it is personal in its character, is not transfer-
able and does not pass by succession. It is 
purely a regulatory measure that can vest no 
property right in the holder. - - An attempt on 
the part of the district court to do so is without 
legal sanction.'' 
To the same effect is Gilmer v. Public Utilities Com-
mission, 67 Utah 222, at 235, 247 P. 284. 
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II. 
THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH 
HAS NO AUTHORITY TO TRANSFER A 
CERTIFICATE OF . PUBLIC CONVENIENCE ANIJ 
NECESSITY IN THE ABSENCE OF A SHOWING 
OF PUBLIC CONVENIENCE AND NECESSITY. 
The Commission is a creature of the legislature and 
has only such po'.-vers as have been granted to it. In 
Bamberger Electric Railroad Company v. Public Utilities 
Commission, 59 Utah 351, 364, 204 P. 314, 320, this 
court rules: 
''It needs no citation of authorities that where 
a specific power is conferred by a statute upon a 
tribunaL board or commission with limited/ powers, 
the powers are limited to such as are specifically 
mentioned. Any other rule would make an 
autocrat of the utilities commission.'' 
This was confirmed in Union Pacific Railroad Company 
v. Public Service Commission, 103 Utah 186, 134 P.2d 469, 
474. 
Recognizing, then, that there can be no implied author"'" 
ity to the Public Service Commission, it becomes necessary 
to determine if there has been an express grant of author-
ity by the legislature to the Commission which would 
permit them to allow a transfer or sale of a certificate of 
convenience and necessity, as was attempted in this case. 
Title 76, Chapter 5, of the Utah Code Annotated, 
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194 3, deals generally with motor transport corporations. 
Section 20 of that chapter provides as follows: 
"No common motor carrier authorized by 
this act to operate shall abandon or discontinue 
any service established under the provisions of 
this act without an order of the commission.'' 
Section 32 provides: 
''Certificates, permits and licenses heretofore 
issued to any common or contract motor carrier 
by the commission shall remain in effect, but 
such carrier shall comply in all other respects 
vdth the provisions of this act.'' 
Section 33 is as follows: 
''The commission may at any time for good 
cause, and after notice and hearing, suspend. alter, 
amend or revoke any certificate, permit or license 
issued by it hereunder.'' 
The above-mentioned powers were all in the act as 
passed by the 1935 legislature as Chapter 65 and evidenced 
a complete consideration of what may or may not be done 
with a certificate, permit or license issued by the commission. 
It will be noticed that there is no comment concerning a 
transfer of such rights. In 1941, however, Title 76, 
Chapter 5, Section 40 vvas added to the title by an amend-
ment, which provides for a ''transfer of operating rights of 
deceased owner." In view of this provision it is clear that 
the issue of transferring certificates was brought before the 
legislature and specifically considered by it. Also equally 
clear is the fact that after such consideration the legislature 
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felt that the only time when a transfer should be permitted 
is in the event of death of an operating owner. This 
theory of statutory construction \vas adopted at an early 
date, 1894, by our Supreme Court in Pettie v. Duke, 10 
Utah 311, 317, 37 P. 568, \Yherein this statement is made: 
''It is a \veil established rule of construction 
that \vhere a statute grants a power or right 
the powers not mentioned in the enumeration are 
intended to be excluded. Suth. St. Canst. Sec. 
325. In the language of the Supreme Court of 
the United States in the case of United States 
v. Arredondo. 6 Pet. 725. 'expressio unis est exclusio 
alterius', is a universal maxim in the construction 
of statute.'' 
This theory of construction was re-affirmed in 1936 in 
Utah Rapid Transit Company v. Ogden City, 89 Utah 546, 
551, 58 P. 2nd 1, wherein this statement is made. 
·'It is one of the well recognized cannons of 
statutory construction that \vhen a statute directs 
a thing rna y be done by a specific means or in a 
particular manner it may not be done by other 
means or in a different manner. The familiar 
maxim, 'expressio unis est exclusio alterius', is 
especially applicable in the construction of a 
statute.'' {Fallowed by citation to numerous 
authorities.) 
Also. see Hansen v. Board of Education, 101 Utah 
15, 25. 116 P. 2nd 936. 
The general rule applicable here is stated by Pond 
on Public Utilities, Th·ird Edition, Section 450, under a 
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section entitled, ''Legislative authority must be express to 
permit transfer'': 
''In the absence of express statutory authority 
a sale and transfer of public utility property and 
franchise rights is not valid, for, as the court in 
the case of People v. Commercial Tel. & Tel. 
Co., 277 Ill. 265, 115 N. E. 379, L. R. A. 
19170. 704. P. U. R. 19170. 272. says: 'It 
is no~' settled by an overwhelming weight of 
authority that publ-ic or quasi public corporations, 
such as gas companies, water companies, electric 
companies, telegraph and telephone companies, 
raih~'ay companies, and all silnilar corporations 
which owe duties to the public as well as to 
their stockholders, have no right to transfer their 
corporate po'Arers and prtvileges, and thereby dis-
able themselves from performing their public 
duties, without legislative authority, 12 R.C.L. 
217, 3 Thompson on Corporations, Sec. 2906; 37 
Cyc. 1616; Cumberland Telephone Co. v. City 
of Evansville (C.C.), 127 Fed. 18, 3 Cook on 
Corporations, Sec. 941; Attorney-General v. 
Haverhill Gaslight C·o., 215 Mass. 394, 101 N. E. 
1061, Ann. Cas. 1914C, 1266, and notes; 
Brunswick Gaslight Co. v. United Gas Co. 
85 Me. 532. 27 Atl. 525. 35 Am. St. Rep. 385. 
and notes; Thomas v. West Jersey Railroad Co., 
101 U.S. 71, 25 L. Ed. 950; Central Transporta-
tion Co. v. Pullman's Palace Car Co., .139 U.S. 
24, 11 S. Ct. 478, 35 L.Ed. 55. * * * The grant 
in the ordinance to the Westfall Telephone 
Company was to it alone, and not to it and its 
successors and assigns, and there were no words 
used in the grant signifying that its successors or 
assigns could succeed to the rights of the 
Westfall Telephone Company. The grant was 
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therefore not assignable as the statutes of our 
state do not expressly authorize such a transfer.'' 
See also cases under Point I of this brief. 
Cases under the Interstate Commerce Commission's 
jurisdiction are of no value as precedents, because the 
statute there specifically permits the transfer. Section 212 
(b) ~f the Interstate Commerce Act provides in part: 
'·except as provided in Section 5 any 
certificate or permit may be transferred, pursuant 
to such rules and regulations as the Commission 
may prescribe.'' 
1 
Rule 2 (b) published by the Interstate Commerce 
Commission permits transfer if the transferee is shown to 
be "fit, willing and able to properly perform the service" 
and if Section 213 is satisfied. Section 213 has been 
repealed and Section 5 governs both as to rail and motor 
carriers and permits acquisitions and transfers subject to a 
determination of ''the public interest''. 
It is true that the Commission promulgated a rule per-
mitting a transfer without proving c~nvenience and ,necessity 
(Motor Carrier Rules and Regulations No. 3, effective 
June 1, 1937, page 5, Rule II) but the promulgation of a 
rule cannot create or establish power or authority not dele-
gated by the I_Jegislature. In State v. Goss, 79 Utah 559, 
II P.2d 340 at 342-343, this Court was interpreting a 
statute granting powers to the State Board of Health where-
in there was said: 
''And shall have authority to make such rules and 
regulations not contrary to the Iavv as may be 
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deemed necessary for the preservation of public 
health." 
and this Court held: 
''The general power to make rules and 
regulations, unlimited except that they shall not 
be contrary to law, is coextensive with the state 
police power as it affects public health. We 
think it clear that under this general language the 
state board of health is not empowered to pass 
rules and regulations having the force· of law 
regulating the conduct of the people of the state 
with respect to all matters having some relation 
to the public health. This, indeed, would be 
the delegation of legislative power if the words, 
of the statute should be so construed. The 
language must be taken to be limited to the 
particular matters and things specified in succeed-
ing sections of the statute wherein duties are 
imposed upon the state board of health with 
respect to particular subjects or situations with 
respect to the public health.'' 
That authority and power cannot be dra\vn from 
broad statements concerning the purpose and function of 
the commission is we II shown in the case of Hansen v. 
Board of Education, supra, page 25 of 101 Utah, 
wherein this statement is made: 
"The blanket provision that it 'may do all 
things needful for the maintenance, prosperity 
and success of the schools and the promotion of 
education' does not enlarge the po'A'ers specifi-
cally conferred.'' 
However, the plaintiffs' case need not rest on this rule 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
29 
of construction. alone. La"vs of Utah. 1927. chapter 42. 
section 7. later known as Title 76. Chapter 5, Section 5. 
Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, provided as follows: 
''No permits granted under this title shall 
be assignable except with the consent, after 
hearing. of the Public Utilities Commission.'' 
This chapter of the la\v was repealed by Laws of 
1933, Chapter 53. Section 35, which was repealed by Laws 
of 1935. Chapter 65, Section 26, and in neither of these 
~ subsequent acts was this transfer provision incorporated into 
the law. From this legislative history it is quite obvious 
that the legislature intended that no power to approve a 
transfer or sale of a certificate of convenience and necessity 
should exist in the Public Service Commission or otherwise, 
except that in 194 1 transfers in the event of death were 
provided for. 
It is worthwhile to notice also that the Public Utilities 
Commission of Utah promulgated rules and regulations 
effective July 6, 1933, and designed to carry out Chapter 
53 of the Session Laws of Utah. 1933, Rule 1 (c) of 
\vhich was as follows: 
"Certificates of convenience and necessity 
are not transferable or assignable.'' 
Thereafter, as above noted, Chapter 53 of the ·Laws 
of 1933 was repealed by Chapter 65, Laws of Utah, 1935, 
although the section requiring certificate of convenience and 
necessity (Section 6) was identical insofar as here pertinent 
\vith Section 7 of Chapter 53. Lavvs of 1933. 
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It therefore appears that without any legislative auth-
orization or change in applicable statutory authority the 
Commission simply decided it would approve the transfer 
of certificates by the device in Rule ·II of Motor Carrier 
Rules and Regulations No. 3, above referred to. Section 
(c) of this rule follows the earlier rules: 
''Certificates of convenience and necessity 
are not transferable or assignable.'' 
But Section (d) goes into a nevv idea and permits a carrier 
to enter into an agreement with another person to transfer 
his operating rights and file a joint application for one to 
discontinue his operations and for the other to assume and 
take over the operations, and ends vvith this provision:. 
''The person desiring to assume said oper-
ating rights shall comply with the provisions of 
Chapter 65, Laws of Utah, 19.35, as in filing 
for a ne\v certificate of convenience and necessity 
except that said person will not be required to 
prove convenience and necessity.~' 
ln establishing such a rule the Commission \vent back to 
the statutory authorization which existed between 1.927 · 
and 1933 and in effect authorized transfers of operating 
authority without showing of convenience and necessity 
after the authority to permit such transfers had been re-
pealed by the legislature. Not until 1941, when transfers 
in the event of deceased ovvners \vas pennitted by the 
legislature, did any statute hark back to the rule of 1927 
laws which permitted assignments. 
On this question olso the Court has previously spokrn 
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in a case where the legislative background was parallel. 
Hansen v. Board of Education of Emery County School 
District, 101 Utah 15, 25-26, 116 P.2d 936. 
''We have heretofore quoted the statutes 
that vested powers in the Board of Education of 
county school districts to 'change or discontinue' 
and sho\vn that this provision or grant of power 
was later taken away. * * * A power once 
granted by the legislature and then withdrawn, 
does not leave the matter of invoking the principle 
of implied power open for consideration. In re 
Phillips' Estate, 193 Wash. 194, 74 P. 2d 101-5; 
. Ogden City v. Gilbert F. Boreman, 20 Utah 98, 
57 P. 843. 
''The legislature has not amended the law to 
vest boards of education with the power to 
'change and discontinue' but has expressly with-
drawn such powers after the power was once given. 
We find nothing in the statutes showing the 
legislature had the intention to vest in the boards 
of education or the successors of the boards of 
trustees the power vested in the old boards of 
trustees, i.e., to change or discontinue schools in 
county school districts.'' 
Section 76-5-18, U.C.A., 1943, requires a sho~ing of 
public convenience and necessity before a certificate can be 
granted. The Commission has no authority to waive the 
requirement. 76-5-19 provides for notice to interested 
parties, for a hearing and the submission of evidence, and: 
''If the commission finds from the evidence 
that the public convenience and necessity require 
the proposed service or any part thereof it may 
issue the certificate as prayed for * * * . '' 
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Without such finding from the evidence submitted the 
Commission cannot issue a certificate of Public Convenience 
and Necessity. 
III. 
THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH 
CANNOT TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE OF THE 
EXISTENCE OF PUBLIC CONVENIENCE AND 
NECESSITY BASED UPON EVIDENCE AT A 
PRIOR HEARING IN ANOTHER CASE. 
The applicants, who are defendants here, have been un-
certain of their position in this proceeding. They have pro-
claimed that they need only show that Lang is fit, willing 
and able to operate satisfactorily to entitle them to their 
transfer and yet have been unable to resist doing lip service 
to the public convenience and necessity requirement. 
In his opening statement Mr. Cornwall said: 
''Inasmuch as the applicant Lang is simply 
acquiring the operating rights of Gould, it is our 
-position in this proceeding, of course, that public 
convenience and necessity is not an issue and not 
involved. It is simply ~a question as to whether 
the Commission \\'iII approve the transfer and 
whether Lang is in a position to render the service 
to the public which Gould has heretofore and is 
novv rendering.'' ( R. 152) 
A little later Mr. Berol argued: 
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"Under this application a new ca(rier or a 
new applicant \tvill merely continue to pr,ovide 
the same service Gould is and has been provid-
ing. Therefore. the degree of proof is less than 
if it was a new applicant. and. under the Statute. 
it is my view that the only proof that is re-
quired here is that the applicant, the Lang 
Transportation Corporation is financially able to 
continue to perform the services Gould has here-
tofore performed. 
"In other words. there will be nq additional 
burden on the highway. there will be no new and 
additional service other than that which exists 
today. Therefore, if I read the Statute correct-
ly, the showing to be made here is that the new 
applicant that is proposing to be substituted in 
lieu of the service provided by Gould, is willi~g 
and able and financially responsible to provide 
the service that is proposed.'' ( R. 172-173} 
And again. Mr. Berol urged: 
"Therefore, as I see it, under these circum-
stances, the degree of the proof that your Corn-
mission should require is fitness, ability, and fi-
nancial ability of the applicant that proposes to 
substitute his service for the service your Corn-
mission has already found is in the public 
interest.'' ( R. 176) 
But at the same time the applicants were trying to 
hurdle the public convenience and necessity hurdle without 
producing the testimony of convenience and necessity which 
is noticeably absent from the record. Thus, Mr. Cornwall 
advised Commissioner Carlson: 
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"Well, of course, Mr. Commissioner, in 
this case we are not now dealing with the question 
in the first instance as to whether public con-
venience and necessity requires the operation. 
That the Commission has heard and passed upon. 
They have determined that public convenience 
and necessity requires that Mr. Gould here, for 
instance, should perform this service. We are 
not now reopening that issue. 
''The only question that we are concerned 
with today is whether the I?erson whom he pro-
poses shall be substituted in his stead is in a posi-
tion to discharge that duty to the public. That 
is all that we are here concerned with today." 
(R. 168-169) 
And Mr. Berol suggested: 
"We have, at the present time, a carrier, 
Gould. who is serving the public under a certifi-
cate heretofore issued by this Commission. This 
Commission has heretofore decided that public 
convenience and necessity requires that service. 
Based on that decision, Gould has been providing 
and performing that service. That service is now 
available to the public. All that is being pro-
--posed here, under the alternative part of the appli-
cation is that Gould discontinue. In other words, 
that his certificate be revoked, which the Statute 
clearly authorizes you to do, and that in his place 
and stead a new certificate be issued to the Lang 
Transportation Corporation, again which the Stat-
ute clearly authorizes you to do. 
"Now, that leaves a question as to the degree 
of proof, and I submit here that applicants under 
this condition, or this Commission, is not put. 
under the statute, to the same degree of proof as 
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though a new applicant \Vere seeking to enter the 
field, and the reason for that is that Gould is 
in the field, and the Commission had found that 
public convenience and necessity requires his 
service. He is providing that service for the 
public." (R. 171-172) 
(Mr. Berol neglected to point out the statutes which 
"clearly authorize" the Commission to do as requested.) 
And so the applicants chose to offer no testimony 
whatever of public convenience and necessity and, as Chair-
man Hacking said, failed "to put in a full fledged case on 
convenience and necessity''. ( R. 181 ) 
When the Report and Order were prepared applicants ' 
exhibited the same attitude: unwillingness to risk absence 
of convenience and necessity and yet realization that they 
were without any proof of it. And so they asked the , 
Commission to accept public convenience and necessity as 
already demonstrated by reason of the existence of a carrier 
with a certificate (R. 41, 42, 44). 
The protestants, who are now plaintiff_s, took the 
position that public convenience and necessity must be 
shown and put in complete evidence of their idle equipment. 
their efficient service, their efforts to obtain nevv b~siness, 
and their ability to handle all the traffic \vithout either 
Gould or Lang. This position was plainly stated 
( R. 183, 184) and uniformly pursued. 
Is the fact that the Commission had previously issued 
Certificate 784 to Gould enough to establish public con-
venience and necessity for Lang 7 Oertificate 784 
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(Ex. 1. R. 66) was issued August 27~ 1947. There is no 
showing of when the hearing was held pursuant to which 
the . certificate was issued and no suggestion that conditions 
were unchanged. In this hearing the protestants testified 
to their ability to serve the public and the equipment they 
had acquired. Where were the shippers who shovv the 
public need? It must be assumed that they are satisfied 
and could not testify to a need. The witness Hurley 
represented a shipper and said his company preferred Lang for 
personal reasons ( R. 407) but admitted that Collett and 
Cantlay & Tanzola had served him well and could again 
(R. 406, 407). 
Exhibit 12 shovvs a fluctuating picture of gasoline 
transportation in Utah, even without the impact of pro-
duction from the two new refineries in North Salt Lake, 
one of which is no\v in operation. On Pages 11 and 12 this 
exhibit is abstracted and shows steady reduction of imports 
and increase of exports, and since more is exported than 
imported there is little place for increased intrastate business 
and no need for Lang \vho wants to expand, as against 
Gould who, if the transfer is denied, will continue to operate 
his business without any plan for expansion ( R. 199). 
And this study further shows that the companies for 
whom Lang hauls into Southern Utah have been steadily 
decreasing their imports and increasing their purchases in 
Utah, so that Lang must look elsewhere for business and 
seeks to start with Gould's operation and expand it. 
It is notable also that Lang has an application for 
certificate of public convenience and necessity pending and 
chooses to short-cut the required showing by buying in 
( R. 211). 
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All · of this shows that Lang does not seek Gould's 
operation, but Gould's certificate so as to permit an ex-
pansion for which there is no public necessity. Factually. 
the case is akin to that of the carrier in Gilmer v. Public 
Utilities Commission. 67 Utah 222, 247 P. 284. 
This was a case \vhere Joseph Carling had operated a 
stage· prior to passage of the Public Utilities Act. He 
obtained a certificate of convenience and necessity to 
operate the · automobile stage line. He inaugurated 
weekly trips in each direction and in 1924 filed a joint 
application with T. M. Gilmer to transfer the certificate. 
The old certificate \vas cancelled and a new one issued to 
T. M. Gilmer \vho proceeded to operate. Gilmer filed 
a schedule of rates for daily service · vvhich was suspended 
"until upon a proper showing made before the commission 
that public convenience and necessity require such addi-
tio~al service". Gilmer contended that no approval vvas 
required, and that the certificate of transfer limiting service 
to that given by Carling \vas beyond the Commission's 
authority. The Commission affirmed the suspension and 
it was upheld by the Supreme Oourt on writ of review. 
The question of the right to transfer was not before 
the court in the Gilmer case. It vvas under an earlier 
statute (Sec. 4818, C.L.U. 1917) which required a 
certificate only for one desiring to "begin" operations as 
~ carrier. But after the transfer was accomplished and 
the new carrier showed that he wanted to expand by 
making daily rather than weekly runs, he was compelled to 
face the test of public convenience and necessity. Lang 
should face the same test, since it is not willing to be 
limited to Gould's operations. 
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By g Iossing over the question of convenience and 
necessity applicants are seeking the benefit of. evidence at 
a prior hearing, involving different parties, at a remote time 
and in a different kind of hearing. The Commission in 
so doing was not acting on the evidence submitted. as re-
quired by 76-5-19, U.C.A., 1943. 
In Utah Power & Light Co. v. Public Service Com-
mission, 107 Utah 155, 209-210, 152 P. 2d 542, 567, this 
Court makes the following extended comment concerning such 
conduct by the Public Service C:ommission: 
"This brings us to a further specification 
of error urged by the company. The Commission 
throughout its report has made several references 
to matters \vhich cannot be verified from any 
matters in the records which were certified to 
this court. The matters to which the Com-
mission thus alluded went beyond the mere 
references to other reports and decisions. For 
example, in regard to the discussion of post-war 
electrical revenues, the Commission referred to 
testimony of Mr. Gadsby in another case 
(No. 2652) \\'hich was pending before the Com-
mission at about this same time. l'1r. Gadsby 
had no opportunity at this hearing to explain 
this testimony to show why it would not be 
applicable to the various situations involved in 
this case or to deny the conclusions which the 
Commjssion dre\v from it. Such references to 
matters \vhich the Company has had no oppor-
tunity to explain or rebut certainly cannot be 
commended. 
''In Los Angeles & Salt L.ake Railroad Co. 
v. Public Utilities Commission, 81 Utah 286. 17 
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P. 2d 287. 290, a similar point was raised. 
The question before the Commission was whether 
a railroad could be permitted to discontinue 
maintaining a station agent at Faust. Utah. with-
out impairment of the services \vhich the law re-
quired it to furnish to the public. At this 
hearing no evidence was taken regarding the needs 
of various sheepmen who used the road for move-
ment of livestock and feed. The Commission 
had had another similar case a short time before 
this hearing. This earlier case involved the 
closing of the station at St. John some 12 miles 
away from the Faust station. In the hearing on 
the St. John case considerable evidence was intro-
duced concerning the needs of the various sheep-
men. In disposing of the case involving the 
closing of the Faust station. the Commission re-
lied upon evidence which had been introduced in 
the St. John case. On certiorari this court held 
that this was error. \Ve said: 'The evidence 
adduced in the St. John Station Case in this re-
gard canriot be considered as evidence adduced 
in this case. While the same counsel for the 
railroad may have appeared in both cases. and 
the same witnesses testified for the railroad in both 
cases, * * * yet the cross-examination which 
the railroad counsel might direct in the Faust 
case to the witnesses who appeared in the St. 
John case, if they appeared in the Faust case, 
might vary materially because of the new wit-
nesses who appeared in the Faust case. The 
Commission. like a jury, can consider such facts 
in relation to evidence adduced which constitute 
the common facts of life and which form the 
common knowledge of mankind and can take· 
judicial knowledge of such facts as a court may 
take judicial notice of. Such facts permit the 
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fact finder to interpret evidence and articulate it 
to the general facts of life. The commission 
may also, perhaps, take judicial notice of such 
facts and practices as are generally known through-
out the whole field of railroad transportation; 
* * * but it cannot take its special knovvledge 
which it may have gained from experience or 
from other hearings and base any findings or con-
clusions upon such knowledge. That is funda-
mental.' To the same effect see Spencer v. 
Industrial Commission, 81 Utah 511, 20 P. 2d 
618." 
In Mulcahy, et al., v. Public Service Con1mission, et 
al., 101 Utah 245, 117 P. 2d 298, the shoe vvas on the 
other foot. There a contract motor carrier between Salt 
Lake City and points in Utah north of there applied in 1936 
for a certificate of convenience and necessity to serve as a 
common motor carrier in its territory, which application was, for 
all practical purposes, denied in 1937. This decision vvas 
confirmed by the Supreme Court on December 5, 1939. 
Prior to that final decision, and on October 13, 1939, 
the contract motor carrier filed another application with the 
commission for a certificate of convenience and necessity 
as a common motor carrier covering the same territory as 
was involved in the 1936 application. The protestants 
argued that the prior determination was res adjudicata in 
the · second hearing and also argued that a transcript of the 
evidence in the first hearing was erroneously rejected by the 
commission at the second hearing because the conditions 
were presumed to be the same until shown by the evidence 
in the second hearing to be different. The court held that 
the first determination \vas not res adjudicata and that 
since it was not there \vas no point in offering the transcript 
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of evidence at the first hearing in the second hearing. At 
page 304 of 117 P. 2d. the court said: 
·'It is evident therefore that there was no 
legal controversy, no controversy at lavv, to call 
into operation the exercise of the judicial function 
or power. and the findings or conclusions made 
would therefore not be a judicial determination 
or judgment, and hence not res adjudicata. Further-
more Chapter 6 of Title 76. R.S.U. 1933, 
provides that all hearings are governed by the 
provisions of the chapter and the rules of practice 
and procedure to be adopted by the Commission. 
There is no provision in the chapter limiting the 
number of times an application , can be made. 
The Commission rule provides it may not be re-
newed \vithin one year, thus showing the Com-
mission did not intend a rejection to be final. 
· "Since the order on the 1937 application is 
not res adjudicata, no point is involved in the 
· refusal to receive in evidence the transcript of 
evidence of that hearing.'' 
In the instant proceeding the applicants offered no 
evidence from the hearing, as a result of which certificates 
were issued to Gould. Collett, Cantlay & T anzola, and 
Clark; and did not even offer in evidence the report of the 
Commission in the Gould application, nor did the applicants 
request the Commission to take judicial notice of conditions 
existing at the time the certificates were issued nor vvas 
there any suggestion that the conditions, insofar as the 
public is concerned, were the same at the time of the 
hearing in the original applications, at the time of the 
orders issuing certificates to Gould. Collett, Clark, and 
Cantlay & T anzola, or at the time of the hearing in this 
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matter. If the order was not res adjudicata in the 
Mulcahy case, which involved the same parties and the 
same territory, certainly the certificate of Gould is not res 
adjudicata in this case of the issue of public convenience 
and necessity. 
And the defendants cannot be aided here on the 
theory o-f a presumption of the continuing existence of a 
condition requiring service to meet the public convenience 
and necessity, if'. indeed, a presumption of such a matter 
would ever be proper. The protestants in this proceeding 
disputed the existence of public convenience and necessity 
by advising the Commission that it would have to be 
proved ( R. 183-184 ) · and proceeded to offer evidence 
that the protestants could handle all of the business with-
out Gould or Lang (R. 373-374, 523, 524)- and that 
the present facilities and equipment of the protestants 
were not being utilized (R. 358, 428, 492. 493). Certainly, 
any presu1nption or inference that might be suggested vvas 
rebutted. or at least dispelled by this evidence of protestants. 
In the absence of a showing of public convenience 
and necessity the certificate issued to Lang \Vas improvi-
dently issued and it is not a sufficient answer that under 
different circumstances and at a different time the Com-
mission saw fit to grant a certificate to Gould ~n evidence 
not now before the Commission or the Court and beyond 
the power of these parties to question, limit or explain. 
CONCLUSION 
Certificates of Convenience and Necessity are personal 
rif]hts, issued under the authority of the Stnte to those vvho 
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can shovl that public convenience and necessity require 
their services. In Utah such certificates vvere once trans-
ferrable under the la\v. The la\v was changed and they 
are now transferrable only in the case of a deceased certifi-
cate holder and upon the approval of the Commission. 
Applicant Lang is therefore entitled to a certificate of 
convenience and necessity only upon making the showing 
required by law. To permit Lang to tie onto Gould's 
operating authority is to permit transfer by calling , it a 
cancellation and re-issue. The re-issue is a new certificate 
and should he issued only on a showing of publtc conven-
ience and necessity. 
The order of the Commission should be reversed and 
set aside. 
Respectfully submitted, 
COLLETI TANK LINES 
By Richards and Bird, Attorneys 
CANTLA Y & TANZOLA. INC. 
By Lamoreaux and Tuft. Attorneys 
CLARK TANKLINES COMPANY 
By Callister, Callister and 1-Jewis, 
Attorneys 
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